Entry of Appearance defendants December 02, 2021 (2024)

Case

Rocket Mortgage LLC Fka Quicken Loans Ll v. Widmar, Johanna

Aug 28, 2024 |Elizabeth Beebe Volz |Rule 120 Deeds of Trust Public Trustee |2024CV031886

Case

Cady, John v. McFarlin And Associates et al

Case

Baranda, Nicole v. Bartolini, Susan

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031884

Case

The Forum Fitzsimons LLC v. Apexx Inc et al

Case

Hardin, Eric et al v. Favor Inc A Foreign Limited Liability Co et al

Case

Drobney, Diana v. Porter, Tatanya Renee et al

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031880

Case

Wetzel JR, Timothy Marshall v. Hca Healthone LLC et al

Case

Colorado Housing And Finance Authority v. Hazelwood, Crystal

Aug 26, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Rule 120 Deeds of Trust Public Trustee |2024CV031862

Case

Colorado Housing And Finance Authority v. Turner, Zakiya et al

Ruling

Song Yang vs Samuel Rodriguez, et al.

Aug 28, 2024 |21CV-02289

21CV-02289 Song Yang v. Samuel Rodriguez, et al.Order to Show Cause re Dismissal-Notice of SettlementAppearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appearremotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remoteappearance. While it appears that there was an attempt to file a request for dismissal,without prejudice, the request filed on August 16, 2024, was not entered because item1(b) (the matter being dismissed) was not completed. Please prepare, complete, and filean appropriate request for Dismissal.

Ruling

WALDEISEN, BY AND THROUGH HIS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST LEWIS PAUL WALDEISEN vs BLC MIRAGE INN LP

Aug 28, 2024 |CVPS2306126

WALDEISEN, BY AND THROUGHPetition to Compel Arbitration by BLCHIS SUCCESSOR IN INTERESTCVPS2306126 MIRAGE INN LP, BROOKDALELEWIS PAUL WALDEISEN vsMANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLCBLC MIRAGE INN LPTentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted.

Ruling

FCS057573 - PEREZ, HEIDI JUDITH VS BOOKER, WESLEY (DMS)

Aug 28, 2024 |FCS057573

FCS057573Motions for ContemptTENTATIVE RULING:Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied.No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to thecourt. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to acontempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

Ruling

Sep 09, 2024 |S-CV-0052078

S-CV-0052078 Myers, Roger et al vs. Fielder, Fielder & Fielder et al** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required.

Ruling

JUSTINA ODEROHA, ET AL. VS ASHANTI LATRICE COLE, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |23TRCV02264

Case Number: 23TRCV02264 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: E Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. E JUSTINA ODEROHA, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No.: 23TRCV02264 vs. [Tentative] ORDER OVERRULING IN PART AND SUSTAINING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART DEMURRER ASHANTI LATRICE COLE, et al. Defendants. Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Moving Party: Defendant 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC Responding Party: Plaintiffs Justina Oderoha, Stephanie Oderoha, Rebecca Oderoha, and Omojefe Christopher Emesaha Demurrer The court considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. RULING Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The demurrer is overruled as to the causes of action for negligence and premises liability but sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the claim for loss of consortium. BACKGROUND On July 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Justina Oderoha , Stephanie Oderoha, Rebecca Oderoha, and Omojefe Christopher Emesaha (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Defendants Ashanti Latrice Cole, Mario L. Rosado, Fresh Ethiopian Restaurant, Elias F. Belete, Solomon Solomon, and 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC for (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (4) motor vehicle negligence, (5) general negligence, (6) premises liability, (7) general negligence, and (8) loss of consortium. On March 15, 2024, the court sustained Defendant 1580 Centinela Associates, LLCs demurrer to the causes of action for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium asserted against it in the complaint with 20 days leave to amend. On April 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint (FAC) against Defendants, asserting the same causes of action. In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that on August 7, 2021, they were on property, owned by Defendant 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC, to eat dinner at Fresh Ethiopian Restaurant. Plaintiffs were seated inside Restaurant, and it was after 2:00 a.m. and the restaurant defendants (Fresh Ethiopian Restaurant and co-owner Solomon Solomon) were still negligently and carelessly serving alcohol to patrons dining inside, including to Defendants Ashanti Latrice Cole and Mario Rosado. An argument began between other guests or patrons inside the restaurant, involving Defendants Cole and Rosado. The subject argument did not involve plaintiffs. The argument continued to escalate as the night went on, and despite the same, the restaurant defendants continued to serve more alcohol, thereby increasing the volatility of the situation and the risk of harm to other patrons, including plaintiffs. Nor did 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC have safety measures in place to prevent excessive and tandem parking that created an unsafe condition on the premises. Once the subject argument got unreasonably and/or excessively loud and heated, the restaurant defendants decided to remove, expel, and/or remove all patrons and guests of the restaurant, including Defendants Cole and Rosado, and eventually Plaintiffs, by ejecting everyone from the restaurant and placing them into the parking lot of the subject premises at the same time. (FAC, ¶ 22.) The FAC further alleges that Defendants Cole and Rosado entered their motor vehicle and exited the property. (Id., ¶ 23.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiffs began to head to their motor vehicle, which was parked in the subject parking lot, in order to head home. There was another vehicle that was parked in tandem behind Plaintiffs vehicle. Plaintiffs were between their own vehicle and the vehicle parked in tandem. Defendants Cole and Rosado reentered the parking lot and drove their vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed, causing their vehicle to violently and forcefully collide into the tandem vehicle, causing the tandem vehicle to be pushed forward, crushing plaintiffs Justina Oderoha and Stephanie Oderoha between the tandem vehicle and Plaintiffs vehicle. (Id., ¶ 24.) On May 7, 2024, Defendant 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC (Defendant) filed this demurrer to the FAC. On July 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On July 16, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendant requests the court take judicial notice of the courts March 15, 2024 minute order in this case. The request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d). LEGAL AUTHORITY A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law &. (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) A special demurrer for uncertainty, Code of Civil Procedure §430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respondi.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Malys of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Ibid.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.) DISCUSSION Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.) Defense counsel has submitted a declaration showing the parties discussed the issues over the telephone. (Rand Decl., ¶ 5.) The meet and confer requirements have been met. Demurrer Defendant 1580 Centinela Associates, LLC demurs to the Sixth Cause of Action for premises liability, Seventh Cause of Action for general negligence, and Eighth Cause of Action for general negligence loss of consortium on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. i. Causes of Action for Negligence and Premises Liability First, the court notes that it previously sustained Defendants demurrer to the causes of action for negligence and premises liability in the complaint on the grounds that: to the extent that liability against Defendant hinges on the furnishing of alcohol, the allegations are insufficient; although plaintiffs allege the existence of a dangerous condition, they do not allege the condition on the property that created an unreasonable risk of harm; and duty was not properly pled because of a lack of foreseeability. (Request for Judicial Notice.) Now, the FAC has been amended to add allegations that Defendant created an unsafe condition by failing to manage or maintain the premises, resulting in the number of cars parking on the property to exceed the available parking spots, which then resulted in impromptu tandem parking. (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 22.) Defendants did not have safety measures in place such as traffic markings, warnings, signage, and/or security, or any other safety or warning mechanism in place to prevent excessive and tandem parking that created an unsafe condition for pedestrians in the parking lot when vehicles enter the parking lot. (Id., ¶ 23.) The FAC further alleges that Defendant failed to have and/or had insufficient, inadequate and/or substandard security and/or safety protocols, controls and/or measures in place, despite there being a history of other incidents occurring on the property and/or at the restaurant, including but not limited to, fights, attacks, robberies, burglaries, carjackings, and/or assaults with guns and/or deadly weapons, which the property owner Defendants and/or restaurant Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about. (FAC, ¶ 20.) As such, Plaintiffs no longer appear to base their theory of liability on the furnishing of alcohol, and instead on the existence of a dangerous condition: the lack of adequate signage in the parking lot, which led to tandem parking. As a result, to the extent that Defendant takes fault with any remaining allegations relating to serving alcohol, a demurrer is not the proper vehicle to contest those allegations because demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action where some valid claim is alleged, but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Therefore, the court will analyze whether there is a valid claim alleged for negligence and premises liability under Plaintiffs theory that the parking lot contained inadequate safety barriers. As to this point, Defendant argues the FAC fails to allege any facts establishing that there was a dangerous condition. Specifically, Defendant argues that the tandem parking issue was not a dangerous condition. The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence:¿duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿ (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.¿(Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)¿The existence and scope of a property owners duty are legal questions for the court.¿(Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th¿at p. 36.)¿ A landowners liability for injuries to person on the property depends on the balancing of a number of factors, particularly the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendants conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendants conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant, and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.¿ (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1145.)¿ [A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated.¿ (Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1187-88.)¿ The court must ascertain whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may be appropriately imposed. (Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Market, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 990, 993.) Foreseeability will not be found where a business has both a curb and wheelstops, the parking lot design is typical of most businesses and meets all city standards and regulations, there were no prior similar incidents and nothing required customers to remain in a fixed location adjacent to the parking area. (Id. at p. 996.) The Court of Appeal in Quik Korner noted that a majority of states have refused to impose liability on defendant-businesses because a third partys negligent act of driving onto a sidewalk and injuring a pedestrian has largely been found to be insufficiently likely as a matter of law, or in other words, unforeseeable. (Id., at pp. 993-994 [[t]here is little California case law regarding cars negligently coming onto the sidewalks of businesses. Courts in other states, however, have considered similar scenarios. The majority have concluded there is no liability because such accidents are insufficiently likely as a matter of law].) However, the Court noted that the issue of liability becomes a question of fact in three categories of cases. (Id., at p. 994.) In the first category are cases where the business provides no protection from encroaching vehicles. In the second, the defendants had knowledge of prior similar incidents. Therefore, the accidents were deemed foreseeable, even when there was some type of barrier. The third category of cases required customers to await service by standing adjacent to a parking lot or driveway. Thus, if a car jumped the curb, there was a high likelihood that a pedestrian would be at the location. (Id. at pp. 994-996.) Here, as noted above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not have safety measures in place such as traffic markings, warnings, signage, and/or security, or any other safety or warning mechanism in place to prevent excessive and tandem parking that created an unsafe condition for pedestrians in the parking lot when vehicles enter the parking lot. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Thus, Plaintiffs allegations in the FAC appear to fit in line with the first category of cases identified in Quik Korner; that Defendant provided no protection from encroaching vehicles. As such, the issue of liability is a question of fact that should be addressed in a motion for summary judgment or left for the jury. The demurrer is overruled on this ground. Next, Defendant hones in on the fact that Plaintiff alleged in the FAC that Defendant should have provided security, and argues that Plaintiff fails to allege there were prior similar criminal incidents in order for Defendant to owe a duty to Plaintiff. In cases involving third parties, businesses have an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to secure their premises, as well as adjacent common areas within their control, against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. (Id.) A heightened foreseeability is required in circ*mstances in which the burden of preventing future harm caused by third party criminal conduct is great or onerous (i.e. where a plaintiff asserts a defendant had a legal duty to provide security guards, bright lighting, activate and monitor security cameras, provide periodic walk-throughs by existing personnel, or provide stronger fencing). (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 243.) Heightened foreseeability is shown by prior similar criminal incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location. (Id.) On the other hand, in cases where the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required." (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 238.) First, the court does not read the FAC to allege that Defendants Cole and Rosados acts were criminal or intentional. Rather, the FAC alleges that Defendants Cole and Rosado reentered the parking lot and drove their vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed, causing their vehicle to violently and forcefully collide into the tandem vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 24.) In any event, even if their acts were criminal, the FAC also identifies minimally burdensome measures Defendant could have taken to prevent the harm, such as providing traffic markings or signage to prevent tandem parking. Given that the burden to prevent harm is minimal in this case, only regular reasonable foreseeability as opposed to heightened foreseeability is required. (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at 665; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 243-44, fn. 24.) As such, a showing of similar criminal incidents is not required here. The demurrer is overruled on this ground. a. Causation Defendant also argues that Defendants Cole and Rosado committed an intentional battery upon Plaintiffs while intoxicated, which is an intervening, superseding cause, negating any causation. The issue of superseding cause is concerned with whether or not, assuming that a defendant was negligent and that his negligence was an actual cause of the plaintiffs injury, the defendant should be held responsible for the plaintiffs injury where the injury was brought about by a later cause of independent origin. (Akins v. County of Sonoma (1967) 67 Cal.2d 185, 199.) This inquiry revolves around a determination of whether the later cause of independent origin, commonly referred to as an intervening cause, was foreseeable by the defendant or, if not foreseeable, whether it caused injury of a type which was foreseeable. If either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, then the defendant is liable towards the plaintiff; if, however, it is determined that the intervening cause was not foreseeable and that the results which it caused were not foreseeable, then the intervening cause becomes a supervening cause and the defendant is relieved from liability for the plaintiffs injuries. (Ibid.)¿ [F]or an intervening act properly to be considered a superseding cause, the act must have produced harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it unfair to hold him responsible. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1016-1017.) As noted above, the court in Quik Korner identified a category of curb-jumping cases where accidents may be foreseeable; one of those categories are where there is no protection from encroaching vehicles in the parking lot. As such, here, the intervening cause Cole and Rosados act of striking the vehicle which then struck Plaintiffs could be seen as foreseeable when there is no protection from encroaching vehicles in the parking lot. The act of striking a pedestrian is also foreseeable. Thus, Cole and Rosados act is not a superseding cause. The demurrer is overruled on this ground. ii. Eight Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium Defendant contends that the claim for loss of consortium fails because it can only be brought by the spouse of an injured person, appears to be brought by all plaintiffs, and cannot be brought by Justina for her own physical injuries. Defendant notes that the confusion stems from plaintiffs not stating the party asserting the cause of action, as required by Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.112. There are four elements to a cause of action for loss of consortium: (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the person injured at the time of the injury; [¶] (2) a tortious injury to the plaintiffs spouse; [¶] (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and [¶] (4) the loss was proximately caused by the defendants act. [Citations.] (Vanhooser v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [emphasis removed].) California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 2.112 provides that each separately stated cause of action must specifically state (1) its number (e.g., first cause of action); (2) its nature (e.g., for fraud); (3) the party asserting it if more than one party is represented on the pleading (e.g., by plaintiff Jones); and (4) the party or parties to whom it is directed (e.g., against defendant Smith). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.112.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the cause of action is brought by Plaintiff Emesaha and none of the other Plaintiffs. The court finds that Plaintiffs did not comply with CRC Rule 2.112 in identifying Plaintiff Emesaha in the caption of the cause of action. The court notes that the prior demurrer was sustained on this ground and Plaintiffs have still failed to correct this. The court will allow Plaintiffs one last chance to correct this; otherwise, it will be inclined to sustain without leave to amend if any further demurrer is brought as to this cause of action. The demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the claim for loss of consortium. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The demurrer is overruled as to the causes of action for negligence and premises liability but sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the claim for loss of consortium. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

SANCHEZ SCOMA VS. PIT RIVER CASINO, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |CVCV20-0196121

SANCHEZ SCOMA VS. PIT RIVER CASINO, ET AL.Case Number: CVCV20-0196121This matter is on calendar for review regarding status and trial setting. The Court notes that thedefault judgment against Mike Avelar on July 22, 2024, was improperly entered (no proof ofservice of summons was on file) and the default was therefore vacated. Additionally, the SecondAmended Complaint was filed without leave of Court and was therefore stricken. This matter isnot at issue. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with astatus of pleadings and service.

Ruling

VIRGIL HOOD VS LISA MOONEY, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |20STCV00267

Case Number: 20STCV00267 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: B VIRGIL HOOD V. LISA MOONEY, ET AL. MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Date of Hearing: August 29, 2024 Trial Date: Not Set Department: B Case No.: 20STCV00267 Moving Party: Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. Responding Party: None BACKGROUND This action arises from a motor vehicle accident. On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff Virgil Hood (Hood) filed a Complaint against Defendants Lisa Mooney and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority alleging a single cause of action for motor vehicle. On March 27, 2020, Plaintiff Maria Alvarez (Alvarez) filed a Complaint against Defendants Lisa Mooney, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and Hector Cardona in Maria Alvarez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV12394, and alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence and statutory liability; and (2) negligence. On September 24, 2021, the instant action and LASC Case No. 20STCV12394 were deemed related, and the instant action was deemed the lead case. On April 4, 2022, the instant action and LASC Case No. 20STCV12394 were deemed consolidated with the instant action being deemed the lead case. On June 7, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Karen Moskowitz sitting in Department B at Van Nuys Courthouse East effective June 24, 2024. On July 30, 2024, the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. (collectively, Counsel) filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Alvarez. [Tentative] Ruling The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. LEGAL STANDARD The court may order that an attorney be changed or substituted at any time before or after judgment or final determination upon request by either client or attorney and after notice from one to the other. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 284(2).) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c)), and MC-053 (Proposed Order) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e)). The proposed order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) The Court has discretion on whether to allow an attorney to withdraw, and a motion to withdraw will not be granted where withdrawal would prejudice the client. (Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed the requisite forms under CRC 3.1362. Mr. Kashani declares that after a settlement was reached between the parties in the case, a breakdown in the relationship with the client made it such that the settlement documents could not be finalized. Plaintiff Maria Alvarezs conduct has made it unreasonably difficult for the attorneys/firm to carry out the representation effectively. According to Mr. Kashani, Plaintiff Maria Alvarez would not voluntarily consent to the firms request to be relieved. The Court finds that the motion to be relieved as counsel is deficient as neither the Form MC-052 nor the Form MC-053 set forth the hearing on the OSC Re: Sanctions for Both Counsels Failure to Effectuate Disposition, which is set for August 29, 2024, and which was set prior to the filing of the motion to be relieved as counsel. (07/12/24 Minute Order.) The motion is therefore not compliant with CRC 3.1362. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

WOO BUM HEO VS HYOUNG WOOK KO

Aug 29, 2024 |23STCV25174

Case Number: 23STCV25174 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Thursday, August 29, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 23STCV25174 CASE NAME: Woo Bum Heo v. Hyoung Wook Ko MOVING PARTY: Defendant Hyoung Wook Ko OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Woo Bum Heo TRIAL DATE: Dismissed PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES OPPOSITION: 5 August 2024 REPLY: 21 August 2024 TENTATIVE: Defendants motion for attorneys fees is granted in the sum of $7,735.00 in attorneys fees plus $120.00 in costs. Defendant to give notice. Background On October 16, 2023, Woo Bum Heo (Plaintiff), in pro per, filed a Complaint against Hyoung Wook Ko (Defendant). The Complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Malicious Prosecution; and (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On February 6, 2024, Defendant filed a Special Motion to Strike under CCP § 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) Plaintiffs Complaint. On May 23, 2024, the court set the anti-SLAPP motion for hearing on June 24, 2024. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiffs request for dismissal of the entire action was granted. On July 18, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion for attorneys fees. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court. motion for attorneys fees I. Legal Standard Pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c), a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs associated with the motion. Under CRC 3.1702, a request for attorneys fees must be made within 180¿days of service of the notice of entry of judgment or within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case[.] A defendant may only recover fees and costs related to the motion to strike. (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383.) This includes fees associated with bringing the motion for fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 (an award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.).) Additionally, [a]ny fee award must also include those incurred on appeal. [Citation.] (Trapp v. Naiman¿(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 113, 122.)¿¿¿ II. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant requests judicial notice of the following: 1) Exhibit 1: Complaint in the action entitled Hyoung Wook Ko. v. Yong Mi Choi, etc., et. al. filed on May 6, 2020, in Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 20STCV17221. 2) Exhibit 2: Statement of Decision on Trial in the action entitled Hyoung Wook Ko. v. Yong Mi Choi, etc., et. al. filed on July 11, 20203 in Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 20STCV17221. III. Discussion Defendant seeks $10,830.00 in attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party in an anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the basis that the prior action did not involve a public issue and/or public interest. Where a plaintiff dismisses an action while an anti-SLAPP motion is pending, the defendant may nonetheless be entitled to recover attorney fees. (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 446.) [N]otwithstanding a dismissal of the action, the trial court has discretion to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees, based on a determination of which party realized its objectives in the litigation. The [Coltrain] court suggested that although the defendant would ordinarily be the prevailing party for purposes of recovering attorney fees, the plaintiff could avoid liability for fees based on a showing that it dismissed the action for reasons unrelated to the probability of success on the merits. (Id., referencing Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 106107.) Therefore, in order for Defendant to be entitled to attorneys fees, the court must determine that Defendant would have prevailed on the merits and that Plaintiff did not dismiss this action because Plaintiff had substantially achieved its goals through a settlement or other means, because the defendant was insolvent, or for other reasons unrelated to the probability of success on the merits. (Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 217.) A. This Lawsuit Arose from A Protected Activity In ruling on a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) First, the court determines whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity, which includes the defendants right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in connection with issues of public interest. (Ibid; CCP, § 425.16.)¿[T]he moving defendant must identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni I).) Here, Plaintiffs first cause of action for malicious prosecution relates to Defendants conduct in the underlying litigation, LASC Case No. 20STCV1722. (Compl., ¶¶ 7-9, 19-30; RJN Ex. 1, 2.) The plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute dictates that every claim of malicious prosecution is a cause of action arising from protected activity because every such claim necessarily depends upon written and oral statements in a prior judicial proceeding. (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 215.) Accordingly, the first cause of action arises out of Defendants petitioning activity. The second cause of action arises out to Defendants refusal to dismiss Plaintiff as a defendant in the prior action. Nonetheless, KO did not dismiss HEO, even if he knew and should have known that HEO was not related to and involved in the Forgery and fabrication of marital documents, abusively and maliciously purposing other ulterior purpose such as a desire to ruin the HEO and intent to use him to pressure his mom, one of other defendants (YOUNG JA CHO). (Compl., ¶ 38.) KO nonetheless flatly denied and ignored HEOs request, seeking other ulterior purpose of harassment and threatening (i.e., use him to pressure his mom, Young Ja Cho). (Id., ¶ 40.) More than three (3) years, HEOs life was extremely tired and rampaged by KOs groundless action, causing serious emotional distress and mental suffering (i.e., Panic-Disorder) in addition to actual damage (Court Costs, legal consulting, etc.). (Id., ¶ 42.) In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 [italics added].) By its terms, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) extends protection not just to speech and petitioning but to certain conduct in furtherance of speech and petitioning. (Bonni I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1020.) Section 425.16 applies to [a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition including any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (CCP, § 426.16 subd. (b)(1), (e)(4).) Here, the second cause of action arises out of Defendants initiation of the underlying action and refusal to dismiss Plaintiff as a defendant. This is all conduct done in furtherance of Defendants petitioning activity. Therefore, the second cause of action also arises from Defendants petitioning activity. B. Plaintiff Could Not Have Prevailed on the Merits due to the Litigation Privilege Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statutei.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal meritis a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 [italics original].) Plaintiffs opposition addresses the probability that Plaintiff could have succeeded on the merits. The court finds that Plaintiff could not have prevailed on the merits due to the litigation privilege. The litigation privilege bars liability for any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that ha[s] some connection or logical relation to the action. [Citation.] (Bowen v. Lin (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 155, 165.) It is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense [the nonmoving party] must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. [Citation.] (Id., at p. 165.) The court finds that the filing of a Complaint against Plaintiff in the underlying action is conduct that falls under the litigation privilege and Defendant is immune from liability. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show he would have prevailed on the merits in this action. C. Reasonable Attorneys Fees i. Reasonable Hourly Rate A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (Christian Research).) The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) Defendants counsel, Sam Muriella (Muriella), has continuously practiced law in Southern California since 1987. (Muriella Decl., ¶ 2, 5.) Muriellas hourly billing rate for this action is $595.00/hour. (Id., ¶ 10.) Muriellas $595.00 hourly billing rate has been approved by other courts in the actions entitled Young Ja Cho v. Hyoung (LASC Case No. 23STCV25288) and Soon Hyung Lee v. Hyoung Ko (LSAC Case No. 23STCV24950.) (Id., ¶¶ 8, 9.) Based on the above, the court finds that Muriellas hourly rate of $595.00 is reasonable. ii. Reasonable Hours Spent The burden is on the party seeking attorneys fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable. (See Vines v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 174, 184.) But [i]n challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez¿(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 citing Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163¿Cal.App.4th¿550, 564.)¿The anti-SLAPP statute provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) The defendant may recover fees and costs only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.) In connection with filing the anti-SLAPP motion, Defendant requests $4,760.00 in fees for 8.0 hours of work. (Muriella Decl., ¶ 4.) In connection with this fee motion related to the anti-SLAPP, Defendant requests $5,950.00 for 10.0 hours of work. Defendant also requests $120.00 in costs for two filings billed at $60.00 each. (Muriella Decl., ¶ 5.) The court finds that the 8.0 hours billed for the anti-SLAPP were reasonably incurred. However, the court finds that the time Defendant spent on this fee motion is excessive given the fact that the motion was not complex and did not require billing records to be produced. The court deducts 5.0 hours or $2,975.00 from the lodestar. The adjusted lodestar is $7,735.00 plus $120.00 in costs. Conclusion Defendants motion for attorneys fees is granted in the sum of $7,735.00 in attorneys fees plus $120.00 in costs. Defendant to give notice.

Document

Thomas, Zaquora v. Shipman, Shay et al

Document

Baranda, Nicole v. Bartolini, Susan

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031884

Document

Keaten, Kathleen et al v. Main Street Apartments et al

Document

Thomas, Zaquora v. Shipman, Shay et al

Document

Drobney, Diana v. Porter, Tatanya Renee et al

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031880

Document

Baranda, Nicole v. Bartolini, Susan

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031884

Document

Thomas, Zaquora v. Shipman, Shay et al

Document

Drobney, Diana v. Porter, Tatanya Renee et al

Aug 28, 2024 |Benjamin Todd Figa |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031880